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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                           DISTRICT OF UTAH
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    UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE
    UINTAH AND OURAY INDIAN
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    RESERVATION, a federally
    recognized Indian Tribe,
                                     Case No. 2:23-cv-00295
         Plaintiff(s),
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    v.
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    DAVID URE, MICHELLE
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    MCCONKIE, MICHAEL STYLER,
    SPENCER COX, UTAH SCHOOL AND )
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    INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS
    ADMINISTRATION,
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         Defendants.
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                BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID B. BARLOW
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                      Monday, November 18, 2024
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                        1:34 p.m. to 1:53 p.m.
                       Motion for Clarification
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                          Status Conference
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    Reported by: Michelle Mallonee, RPR, CCR (801) 209-4979
    351 S. West Temple, #7.130, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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1 **APPEARANCES** 2 For Plaintiff Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 3 Ouray Reservation: 4 LINDA F. COOPER, ESQ. PATTERSON EARNHART REAL BIRD & WILSON LLP 5 1900 Plaza Drive Louisville, Colorado 80027 (303) 926-5292 6 lcooper@nativelawgroup.com 7 J. PRESTON STIEFF, ESQ. 8 J. PRESTON STIEFF LAW OFFICES LLC 311 S. State Street, Suite 450 9 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 366-6002 10 jps@stiefflaw.com 11 For Defendants Michelle McConkie, and Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration: 12 13 VANESSA R. WALSH, ESQ. UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 14 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 (801) 366-035 $\overline{3}$ 15 vwalsh@agutah.gov 16 ROBERT G. WING, ESQ. 17 PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 101 South 200 East, Suite 700 18 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 532-7840 19 rwing@parrbrown.com 20 For Defendant Governor Spencer Cox and Former Director 21 Michael Styler: 22 KYLE J. KAISER, ESQ. UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 23 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 2.4 (801) 366-0353 kkaiser@agutah.gov 25

For Defendant David Ure: ANDREW R. HOPKINS, ESQ. UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 160 East 300 South, 5th Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 (801) 366-0353 arhopkins@agutah.gov * * *

Monday, November 18, 2024; Salt Lake City, Utah 1 2 1:34 p.m. 3 -000-4 THE COURT: Good afternoon. We're convened in 5 Case No. 2:23-cv-295, the Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and 6 Ouray Reservation v. Ure, et al. 7 Would counsel for the plaintiff please state their 8 appearance. 9 MR. STIEFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 10 Stieff along with Linda Cooper for the plaintiff. Ms. Cooper will be conducting the argument on our behalf. 11 12 THE COURT: Very well. Thank you, Counsel. 13 Counsel for the defendants. 14 MS. WALSH: Vanessa Walsh and Robert Wing for 15 SITLA and Michelle McConkie. 16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 MR. KAISER: Kyle Kaiser for Governor Cox and the 18 former Director Styler. 19 MR. HOPKINS: And Andrew Hopkins for David Ure. 20 Thank you, Counsel. And thank you for THE COURT: 21 the correction of the pronunciation of his name as well. 22 All right. So we're here on a motion for 23 clarification and for a status conference. And the posture 24 means that, really, what we'll be doing here is not you 25 making arguments to me about what I did, but me explaining

to you, since you've raised some questions about what it was that the Court did or did not do in its ruling. But I still want to hear from you. So I'm going to give my thoughts in response, answering the questions that you raised, talk a little bit about the posture of the case and maybe how that led us to be where we are right now. Then I'll suggest a way forward and hear any of your thoughts regarding it.

So of course, I, in doing this, reviewed the Order, the Complaint, and the briefing on the motions that we're here to discuss.

I'll state initially, just because I think it will be helpful to you going forward in this case as we work on this together, that the seeds of the uncertainty that ended up coming to fruition in the ruling, to me, sort of begin with the Complaint itself. And here's what I mean by that -- not the entirety of the Complaint, but just parts of it.

The Complaint itself is really heavily focused on an alleged conspiracy to deprive the individuals of the Tribe of their constitutional rights. It begins very early in the complaint and permeates it. I think I brought a copy of the Complaint here with me. I'll give you some examples of what I'm talking about here.

So for example, looking at paragraphs, starting with 82, "As part of their conspiracy and also to hide their

unlawful conspiracy from the Tribe and the public, 1 Defendants created a false public record." 2 3 "Behind the scenes, Defendants conspired that the 4 public record would begin with SITLA publicly giving DNR an opportunity to increase its bid...." 5 6 Defendants knew that the bid was a sham. 7 "Consistent with that conspiracy...SITLA 85. 8 publicly gave DNR twenty-four hours to counter the Tribe's 9 bid." 10 86. "Consistent with that conspiracy, DNR 11 submitted a new...bid." 12 88. "Defendants knew the bid...was a sham." 13 89. Defendants conspired that after certain 14 actions were taken, other actions would be taken, and so on 15 and so forth. So that seems to be the thrust of the Complaint 16 17 here. 18 If I were summarizing my understanding of the 19 Complaint in a single sentence, I think it would have to be 20 something like: This case involves a wide-ranging 21 conspiracy of state employees to deprive the plaintiff of 22 the right to purchase Tabby Mountain, or something like 23 that. 24 So then we get to the causes of action. 25 get to Count No. 1, and it references either conspiracy,

acting in concert, or defendants' actions collectively instead of individually at least ten times, by the Court's count. But Count 1 also, especially -- this is made clear in retrospect -- is ambiguous because of how it was pled. Count 1 references two constitutional provisions, equal protection and due process; five federal statutory provisions, Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, 2000d, so it might be read to be stating one claim or two claims or three claims. The reader can't tell with confidence, because we have so many different constitutional and statutory provisions that are referenced. And again, the thrust of the Complaint seems to be grounded in conspiracy.

So we have at the outset kind of a pleading clarity problem that I think has got us in this posture right now; meaning, as a general matter, as all the experienced and talented lawyers before me know, the practice is one count, one claim. So that's why we have multiple counts in the Complaint, is so that you parse them out into however many different claims that you have, and each one contains one and not more than one, so you don't end up with a situation where there's a question about whether you're pleading one thing or two things or three things.

There is another ambiguity in the Complaint, and that is the lack of any discussion of whether certain actors

1 are being sued in their official or individual capacities.

We just don't really have information about that in the

Complaint regarding Governor Cox, Director Ure, and then

McConkie, and Styler. Then, of course, as you know already,

the Court dealt with that as best it could, based on the

6 information that it had in the order.

So that's the posture in which the Court encounters the Complaint. And in some ways, that's why you sometimes have multiple, you have more than one complaint -- or an amended complaint, is what I mean to say, because the case is in its early stages.

Now, we're here specifically because the defendants had asked the Court to clarify four things. And of course, I have the plaintiff's position on where the Court should be on those things.

Question No. 1 -- well, in some ways these were postured not so much as questions, but here's how I'd like the Court to view what it did, or here's what I hope the Court did in its opinion.

So defendants, first they clarify that Count No. 1 has been dismissed in its entirety, not just the conspiracy claim. So Count No. 1, the Court did dismiss it in its entirety without prejudice, but that was because the Court viewed it as a conspiracy claim, a conspiracy to deprive the Tribe of its due process and equal protection rights, not as

three different claims -- a conspiracy-to-deprive claim, a due-process claim, and an equal-protection claim -- because the Court's expectation is that each claim will be stated separately by plaintiff in a cause of action.

So if plaintiff meant to state or intends to state multiple different causes of action, the process would be to file an amended complaint making that clear, so we just have one in each; each count would state what claim is being alleged against which particular defendants and in what capacity, meaning official or individual.

The second issue was to clarify that Count 2 has been dismissed. This is the plea for declaratory and injunctive relief. And I'm not really sure why defendants were asking about that. I don't recall the motions to dismiss discussing Count 2's request for declaratory and injunctive relief in any detail. It may be that I missed it, but I don't recall this being a feature of the motions. In any event, the opinion certainly doesn't address it or dismiss it. So Count 2 has not been addressed or dismissed by the Court.

Now, to make it clear enough, these are requests for particular kinds of relief, they're not stand-alone claims. So there isn't some specific individual liability in Count 2, but instead, something that would be addressed at a later date.

The third issue was to clarify that Governor Cox, Director Styler, and Director McConkie have been dismissed as defendants, both in their official and individual capacities.

Now, I start by noting that the Court, of course, does not dismiss defendants but dismisses claims. Having said that, I don't see a current non-dismissed claim where Governor Cox is a defendant. So I think post the Court's order, I don't see where he would still be present with a claim against him.

Current Director McConkie and Former Director

Styler, I believe, are still in on Count 3, breach of trust,
which the Court did not address.

All right. And then the fourth question was to clarify that no claims remain against SITLA. So on that one, again, I'm not sure why the defendants are asking about that. Page 22 of the order states that SITLA "is entitled to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court," so I think that's contained very explicitly already in the ruling. If it's immune under the Eleventh Amendment, then it's not capable of being sued in federal court. So those are my thoughts in response to the defendants' questions.

I have already indicated but want to make plain, Counsel for the plaintiff, that we're at an early stage in

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the litigation. These clarifications can be made by the plaintiff, if they wish to make them. And the nature of your interactions suggested to the Court that that would very likely be the result. So I've done my best here to explain to you what my thinking was regarding it. And I want to give you both a chance to say anything that you'd like to about that clarification, and then we can see whether there's anything else to take up. So we're here on the defendants' motion. going to go ahead and let you speak first, and then I'll turn to plaintiff's counsel. MS. WALSH: Is standing at the podium better? THE COURT: Yeah, it's probably easier here just because the microphones will be closer to where you'll be speaking. MS. WALSH: I just had a couple of questions, Your Honor, as were you going through that. We still have a little bit of a question. One of the counts, I think it was Count 3,

One of the counts, I think it was Count 3, dismissed Ms. McConkie in her individual capacity. And I want to, I guess, make sure that I'm clear: She's remaining in Count 3 in her official capacity?

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to add to the ruling in any way. So if I didn't address official

capacity, then I haven't said anything about it. And the question would be whether she was brought in the suit in her official capacity or not.

Again, back to our original issue, I don't remember the Complaint ever saying whether people were being brought in their official capacity or individual capacity.

And I suspect we're going to see a new complaint anyway. At least plaintiff's counsel appears -- I'm not going to speak for her. She will speak for herself momentarily.

Go ahead, Counsel.

MS. WALSH: The Court also -- they made a Rule 8 argument for Ms. McConkie in her individual capacity because there are no allegations pled to her. And the Court didn't, outside of the conspiracy, did not address the Rule 8.

Can we take either no allegations against her in her individual capacity for all of the claims, or just specific to that one and she remains in in her individual capacity for the other claims?

THE COURT: So Counsel, if I failed to do that, like if I inadvertently didn't address that specific issue, I won't expand it now from the bench. And so if I failed to cover it, whether we have a new amended complaint or not, the defense side will have leave either to address an amended complaint, if that's what we get, or if we do not and you feel like there is an additional motion that needs

to be filed to address something that the Court may have 1 2 missed, you'll have leave to do so. 3 MS. WALSH: Okay. And then my final comment. 4 The Court indicated that in our motion to dismiss, 5 we did not discuss Claim 2 for specific relief. And I would 6 point the Court to Section 1.3 of our motion to dismiss and 7 then Section 2 of our reply brief, in which we addressed 8 both of those. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel. 10 Counsel for the plaintiff? 11 MS. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor. We certainly 12 appreciate what you point out about the Complaint, and so I 13 thank you and say that an amended complaint will be 14 forthcoming. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. And Counsel, how long would you like to have? 16 17 Just so that we kind of have the batting order set up, about 18 how long would you like to file the amended complaint? 19 MS. COOPER: Would 30 days be acceptable? 20 THE COURT: Umm-hmm. We normally do 28 or 38. 21 Let's call it 30. 22 And then the ordinary briefing schedule would 23 apply, so 28, 28, and 14 to the motion to dismiss, unless 24 anybody would like to move for something different than 25 that.

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MS. COOPER: Okay.
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              THE COURT: Is that acceptable to the plaintiff's
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    side?
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              MS. COOPER: Yes, it is, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: How about the defense side?
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    Twenty-eight, and then plaintiff will have 28, and then
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    you'll have 14?
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              MR. KAISER: It would be acceptable to me, Your
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            I was just doing the math in my head. That will put
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    our responses due through the holiday season. So I would
    say that that timeline is fine now, but we might request an
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    extension if the holidays....
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              THE COURT: Sure. And I know that counsel for
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    both sides, you'll work together on those issues, especially
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    on something like this and so early in the case. If you
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    agree to some other schedule, there won't be an issue. But
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    do let us know so that we can adjust our order. Okay.
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              MS. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: You're most welcome.
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              Counsel?
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              MR. KAISER: May I ask one further clarification
22
    question?
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              THE COURT: You may.
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              MR. KAISER: In the Court's clarification, you
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    said that Mr. Styler and Ms. McConkie were still -- or
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Ms. McConkie was still in on Count 3. Count 3 is the breach of trust claim that is brought under state law, and a conspiracy to violate law, state and federal. And as I read the Court's order on page 38, it says, "The Tribe's non-breach of contract state law claims are dismissed." I understood that to apply not only to the subsequent claims of equitable estoppel and whatever those were sort of at the end, but also to the breach of trust claims because of the conspiracy to violate law that appeared to be addressed by the Court's order on Count 1. And so the only thing that would have been left was breach of trust under state law.

Was it the Court's intent to dismiss that breach of trust claim? And it might not matter, because we're going to get an amended complaint. But to the extent that the arguments that we made about the state law claims would apply to the breach of trust claim under state law, that might affect what the plaintiff decide to do on their amendment, and it might affect our arguments in the future. So clarification would be helpful.

THE COURT: Okay. So I feel like all of this is really sort of mooted by the fact that we're going to have an amended complaint. I appreciate you raising it, but I don't know that there's any need to parse it. And I don't recollect, as I sit here now about, in terms of how it was argued by both sides in your briefs, whether it was clear

that all that was left for breach of trust was a state law avenue or not.

And again, I guess we have a smaller species in Count 3 of the issue that I raised for Count 1, which is we have a breach of trust allegation and then a conspiracy to violate law. The breach of trust appears to be stated under state law, the conspiracy to violate law under state and federal law.

So I wonder if in this next go-around we'll have an opportunity for a pleading that just contains one cause of action under each count, and it will probably help all of us, including the Court, to be more precise in that next round. So why don't we leave it there, Counsel.

MR. KAISER: Thank you. I appreciate it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Counsel, first for the plaintiff and then for the defendants, is there anything else that we should take up in this hearing today?

MS. COOPER: Your Honor, on behalf of the plaintiff, we have nothing else. And we thank the Court for its time.

THE COURT: Most welcome. Thank you, Counsel.

Anything from counsel for the defendants that you wish to take up?

MS. WALSH: No, thank you.

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MR. KAISER: No, thank you, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: All right, then. Very well. Counsel,
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    thank you for your efforts in this matter. We'll be in
    recess. And if you need a scheduling order that is
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    different than the 28, 28, and 14, you'll let me know that
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    you've agreed, or that you, unfortunately, despite your best
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    efforts, cannot agree, and then we'll help you resolve it.
    Thank you, Counsel, we're in recess.
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         (The matter concluded at 1:53 p.m.)
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COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 1 2 3 State of Utah SS. 4 County of Salt Lake) 5 I, Michelle Mallonee, a Registered Professional Reporter in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 6 That the proceedings of said matter was 7 reported by me in stenotype and thereafter transcribed into typewritten form; 8 That the same constitutes a true and correct 9 transcription of said proceedings so taken and transcribed; 10 I further certify that I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any of the parties of said cause of action, and that I am not interested in the event 11 thereof. 12 WITNESS MY HAND at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 13 3rd day of December 2024. 14 15 Michelle Mallonee 16 17 Michelle Mallonee, RPR, CCR Utah CCR #267114-7801 18 Expires May 31, 2026 19 20 21 22 23 2.4 25 18